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Brandt et al. (2013) have recently disproved a conjecture by Schwartz (1990)
by non-constructively showing the existence of a counterexample with about
10136 alternatives. We provide a concrete counterexample for Schwartz’s con-
jecture with only 24 alternatives.
1 Introduction
A tournament T is a pair (A,≻), whereA is a set of alternatives and ≻ is an asymmetric and
complete (and thus irreflexive) binary relation on A, usually referred to as the dominance
relation. The dominance relation can be extended to sets of alternatives by writing X ≻ Y
when x ≻ y for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . For a tournament (A,≻), an alternative x ∈ A, and
a subset X ⊆ A of alternatives, we denote by DX(x) = { y ∈ X | y ≻ x } the dominators
of x. A tournament solution is a function that maps a tournament to a nonempty subset
of its alternatives (see, e.g., Laslier, 1997, for further information). Given a tournament
T = (A,≻) and a tournament solution S, a nonempty subset of alternatives X ⊆ A is called
S-retentive if S(DA(x)) ⊂ X for all x ∈ X such that DA(x) 6= ∅. Schwartz (1990) defined
the tournament equilibrium set (TEQ) of a given tournament T = (A,≻) recursively as
the union of all inclusion-minimal TEQ-retentive sets in T .
Schwartz conjectured that every tournament contains a unique inclusion-minimal TEQ-
retentive set, which was later shown to be equivalent to TEQ satisfying any one of a num-
ber of desirable properties for tournament solutions (Laffond et al., 1993; Houy, 2009a,b;
Brandt et al., 2010a; Brandt, 2011b; Brandt and Harrenstein, 2011; Brandt, 2011a). This
conjecture was recently disproved by Brandt et al. (2013) who have shown the existence
of a counterexample with about 10136 alternatives using the probabilistic method. Since
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it was shown that TEQ satisfies the above mentioned desirable properties for all tour-
naments that are smaller than the smallest counterexample to Schwartz’s conjecture, the
search for smaller counterexamples remains of interest. In fact, the counterexample found
by Brandt et al. (2013) is so large that it has no practical consequences whatsoever for
TEQ .
In this note, we provide a tournament of order 24 with two disjoint TEQ-retentive
sets. In contrast to the previous counterexample, both TEQ-retentive sets are of the same
order and even isomorphic. On the other hand, the tournament does not constitute a
counterexample to a weakening of Schwartz’s conjecture by Brandt (2011b).
Let nTEQ be the greatest natural number n such that all tournaments of order n or less
admit a unique minimal TEQ-retentive set. Together with earlier results by Brandt et al.
(2010b), we now have that 12 ≤ nTEQ ≤ 23.
The counterexample is based on new structural insights about tournament solutions that
we will explore further in future work.
2 The Counterexample
We define a tournament T = (A ≻) with 24 alternatives that has two disjoint TEQ-
retentive sets X = {x1, . . . , x12} and Y = {y1, . . . , y12} with A = X ∪ Y . The two induced
subtournaments T |X and T |Y are isomorphic.
Let X1 = {x1, . . . , x6}, X2 = {x7, . . . , x12}, Y1 = {y1, . . . , y6}, and Y2 = {y7, . . . , y12}.
Then, the dominance relation between alternatives in X and Y is defined as illustrated in
Figure 1.
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Figure 1: The structure of the counterexample. The two subtournaments T |X and T |Y are
isomorphic and of order 12. Furthermore, X1 ≻ Y2, X2 ≻ Y1, Y1 ≻ X1, and
Y2 ≻ X2.
The dominator sets in T |X (and equivalently in T |Y ) are defined as follows:
DX(x1) = {x4, x5, x6, x8, x9, x12}, DX(x2) = {x1, x6, x7, x10, x12},
DX(x3) = {x1, x2, x6, x7, x9, x10}, DX(x4) = {x2, x3, x7, x8, x11},
DX(x5) = {x2, x3, x4, x8, x10, x11}, DX(x6) = {x4, x5, x9, x11, x12},
DX(x7) = {x1, x5, x6, x11, x12}, DX(x8) = {x2, x3, x6, x7, x12},
DX(x9) = {x2, x4, x5, x7, x8}, DX(x10) = {x1, x4, x6, x7, x8, x9},
DX(x11) = {x1, x2, x3, x8, x9, x10}, and DX(x12) = {x3, x4, x5, x9, x10, x11}.
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A rather tedious check reveals that
TEQ(DA(x1)) = {x4, x8, x12} ⊂ X, TEQ(DA(x2)) = {x6, x10, x12} ⊂ X,
TEQ(DA(x3)) = {x6, x7, x9} ⊂ X, TEQ(DA(x4)) = {x2, x7, x11} ⊂ X,
TEQ(DA(x5)) = {x2, x8, x10} ⊂ X, TEQ(DA(x6)) = {x4, x9, x11} ⊂ X,
TEQ(DA(x7)) = {x1, x5, x11} ⊂ X, TEQ(DA(x8)) = {x3, x6, x12} ⊂ X,
TEQ(DA(x9)) = {x2, x5, x7} ⊂ X, TEQ(DA(x10)) = {x4, x6, x7} ⊂ X,
TEQ(DA(x11)) = {x1, x2, x8} ⊂ X, and TEQ(DA(x12)) = {x3, x4, x9} ⊂ X.
Hence, X is TEQ-retentive in T . Moreover, it can be checked that TEQ(DA(yi)) ⊂ Y for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , 12}, which implies that Y is TEQ-retentive as well. In fact, we even have
that, for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , 12}, yj ∈ TEQ(DA(yi)) if and only if xj ∈ TEQ(DA(xi)).
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